Language production—talking—is a facet of language performance. Its special properties may be set in relief against the backdrop of Noam Chomsky’s (1965, p. 3) famous definition of the subject matter of linguistics:

Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance.

By contrast, psycholinguistic theory is concerned with real speakers who are vulnerable to memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying their knowledge of the language. Regarding language production in particular, the goal of psycholinguistics is to explain how real speakers in real time retrieve and assemble elements of language from long-term memory in order to communicate their ideas.

The chief issues in language production centre on information processing, and include how and when the processing system retrieves different kinds of linguistic knowledge, how the system uses the knowledge once it has been retrieved, how the system interrelates linguistic and non-linguistic
knowledge, and how the system is organised within and constrained by
human cognitive capacities. In this chapter we will survey the kinds of
phenomena that serve as focal points for research on production, present
an overview of the cognitive processes that take place in the course of
creating an utterance, and summarise some of the psycholinguistic
findings that illuminate the workings of these processes. At the end we
will consider how language production fits into the broader framework of
psycholinguistic research.

PHENOMENA OF LANGUAGE PRODUCTION

The facts that a theory of language production should explain are not
immediately obvious, because—intuitively—talking isn't hard. In a
lecture delivered at the University of Illinois in 1909, a famous founder of
American psychology claimed to be able to "read off what I have to say
from a memory manuscript" (Titchener, 1909, p. 8). This caricatures
one's usual experience when speaking, but perhaps not by much. Talking
seems just too easy to pose any problems worth explaining.

Because of this, the challenges of production are more readily appreci-
ated in terms of talk's typical failures. The failures range widely. One
sort is illustrated by a psychology professor's experience during a transi-
ten neurological episode. During the attack, the professor was able to
form perfectly coherent messages, but could not express them (Ashcraft,
1993, pp. 49, 54):

The thoughts can only be described in sentence-like form, because they were
as complex, detailed, and lengthy as a typical sentence. They were not
sentences, however. The experience was not one of merely being unable to
articulate a word currently held in consciousness. Instead, it was one of
being fully aware of the target idea yet totally unable to accomplish what
normally feels like the single act of finding-and-saying-the-word ... The idea
... was as complete and full as any idea one might have normally, but was
not an unspoken mental sentence ... It was the unusual "gap" in this
usually seamless process [of sentence production], a process taken comple-
tely for granted in normal circumstances, that amazes me.

More than a century earlier, William James (1890, pp. 251–252) described
another type of failure during speech, the common tip-of-the-tongue
experience, in which a single circumscribed meaning comes to mind but
the corresponding word does not:

Suppose we try to recall a forgotten name. The state of our consciousness is
peculiar. There is a gap therein: but no mere gap. It is a gap that is inten-
sely active. A sort of wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a given
within and constrained by e will survey the kinds of rch on production, present take place in the course of e of the psycholinguistic processes. At the end we the broader framework of

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90, pp. 251–252) described common tip-of-the-tongue eaning comes to mind but late of our consciousness is p. It is a gap that is inten t, beckoning us in a given
direction, making us at moments tingle with the sense of our closeness, and then letting us sink back without the longed-for term. If wrong names are proposed to us, this singularly definite gap acts immediately so as to negate them. They do not fit into its mould. And the gap of one word does not feel like the gap of another, all empty of content as both might seem necessarily to be when described as gaps.

These introspections allude to gaps in the process of putting ideas into words, but gaps of different kinds. Ashcraft experienced an unbridgeable gap between the thought he wanted to convey and the cognitive processes that normally create the linguistic form to express that thought. The tip-of-the-tongue state that James described reveals a gap between a single concept and the word that expresses it.

In addition to such problems of omission, there are problems of commission. Table 12.1 presents a selection, drawn from our own observations, of the many kinds of speech errors that have been studied in research on language production. The first two examples are anticipations—saying too early a word or a sound that is supposed to come later in the utterance. The next two are perseverations—repeating a word or a sound from earlier in the utterance. Sometimes two linguistic elements exchange places in an utterance, as illustrated in examples 5–8. Still

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Error</th>
<th>Intended Utterance</th>
<th>Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Word anticipation</td>
<td>bury me right with him</td>
<td>bury him right with him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sound anticipation</td>
<td>the lush list</td>
<td>the lush list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Word perseveration</td>
<td>evidence brought to bear on representational theories</td>
<td>evidence brought to bear on representational evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sound perseveration</td>
<td>President Bush’s budget</td>
<td>President Bush’s boodget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Word exchange</td>
<td>the head of a pin</td>
<td>the pin of a head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sound exchange</td>
<td>occipital activity</td>
<td>occipital activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Stranding exchange</td>
<td>the dome doesn’t have any windows</td>
<td>the window doesn’t have any domes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Phrase exchange</td>
<td>the death of his son from leukaemia</td>
<td>the death of leukaemia from his son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Semantically related word-substitution</td>
<td>I like berries with my cereal</td>
<td>I like berries with my fruit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Phonologically related word-substitution</td>
<td>part of a community</td>
<td>part of a committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Sound substitution</td>
<td>the disparity</td>
<td>the disparity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Word blend</td>
<td>it really stood/stuck out</td>
<td>it really stood out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Phrase blend</td>
<td>at large/on the loose</td>
<td>at the loose</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
another type of error, called a substitution, is to say a word or sound other than the one that was intended, as shown in examples 9–11. The final sort of error illustrated in the table is when a speaker blends two words or phrases together, as in the last two examples.

The most common problem in production is disfluency: Speakers commit false starts, they pause silently or noisily (saying “uh” or “um”) in the course of an utterance, and they retrace their verbal steps. They do these things very often. Considering only filled pauses (“uh”, “um”, and “er”), the average rate in the lectures of 45 professors from 10 different disciplines has been clocked at one pause every 18 seconds (Schachter, Christenfeld, Ravina, & Bilous, 1991). Some of these disfluencies reflect simple indecision about what to say next, but others stem from momentary disruptions in specific language processes, such as retrieving a particular word or constructing an expression.

Speech errors and disfluencies both provide clues about the nature of information processing in language production. A schematic view of what they suggest about the processes and their organisation is shown in Fig. 12.1. In the next section we will explain how the components of the figure relate to the errors that people commit when they talk.

THE COGNITIVE COMPONENTS OF LANGUAGE PRODUCTION

Production begins with an intention to communicate an idea. The idea is called a message, and we assume that it is a thought, largely unadorned by the trappings of language. At this level, the messages of a French speaker may not be much different from those of an English speaker, or a Japanese speaker, or a speaker of any language. Returning to Ashcraft’s description of his transient neurological episode, it appears that he was able to formulate messages but was momentarily unable to express them in language.

In terms of the model in Fig. 12.1, what was missing was the ability to carry out the cognitive work that is needed for finding words and putting them together (grammatical encoding) or for finding sounds and putting them together (phonological encoding). Notice in the figure that these processes are separated into two different components. There are several reasons for this separation. We will briefly survey four of them.

First, consider the frequency with which different kinds of elements are involved in errors, shown in Fig. 12.2. Two kinds of units stand out. Among the meaningful units, words are more frequently implicated than any others, and among the sound units, phonemes (single sounds) are by far the most frequently involved. This would not be surprising if words and phonemes were the most common units in speech overall, but they
to say a word or sound other than disfluency: Speakers say "uh" or "um") their verbal steps. They do so by pauses ("uh", "um", and "er") from 10 different professors from 10 different universities. Part of these disfluencies reflect disfluencies stemming from momentary pauses.
and arranging words (grammatical encoding) and a set of processes that deal mainly with finding and arranging phoneme segments (phonological encoding).

A second reason for separating the grammatical and phonological components can be seen in another feature of exchange errors. The words in exchanges usually represent the same grammatical category: Nouns exchange with nouns, verbs with verbs, and so on. By contrast, when a phoneme exchanges with another phoneme, there is no obvious grammatical similarity between the words in which the exchanging phonemes originated. So, counter to what one would expect if syntactic categories constrained all production processes, the syntactic categories of the containing words are irrelevant to sound exchanges. However, the exchanging sounds themselves tend to come from similar phonological categories: Consonants exchange with other consonants, whereas vowels exchange with other vowels. The implication again is that one component of the production system attends to the syntactic category of words in order to arrange them grammatically, while another component attends to the sounds of words and is oblivious to their syntactic functions.

FIG. 12.2 The frequency of different types of linguistic units in exchange errors (from Dell, 1995). Copyright © (1995) MIT Press. Reprinted with permission.
A third piece of evidence for the separation of grammatical and phonological processes comes from yet another property of word and sound exchanges. Words that exchange are typically separated by a phrase or two, whereas sounds that exchange usually come from adjacent words in the same phrase (Garrett, 1980a). This observation suggests that grammatical processes and phonological processes differ in the range over which they operate, with grammatical encoding having a longer view of the eventual utterance than phonological processes.

The model's division into grammatical and phonological processes can also help to explain the features of certain complex errors, such as "The squeaky grease gets the wheel". The speaker intended to say "The squeaky wheel gets the grease", implying that someone who whines and complains is more likely to get attention than someone who suffers in silence. According to the model in Fig. 12.1, the erroneous utterance occurred because of two distinct disruptions. First, in arranging the words, the grammatical component misplaced the nouns wheel and grease, setting the stage for the utterance "The squeaky grease gets the wheel". But then something else went wrong. Since squeaky and grease became next-door neighbours as a result of the word-exchange error, they were close enough for their sounds to exchange, and two of them did. So, while ordering the words' phonemes, the /r/ and /w/ sounds exchanged, leading to "squeaky gwease".

**GRAMMATICAL ENCODING**

Now we will look inside the grammatical component at the processes that retrieve and arrange words. There are two sets of operations, divided into functional processing and positional processing. In describing these operations, we will make use of an analogy to a mental dictionary with entries arranged like the one in the left panel of Fig. 12.3, and a mental sentence skeleton constructed like the one in the right panel. Notice that the lexical entry works like one in a reverse dictionary, or Roget's (1852) original thesaurus, a dictionary in which entries must be consulted according to their meanings rather than their letters or sounds.

**Functional processing**

Functional processing is concerned with selecting words from the mental lexicon (lexical selection) and assigning syntactic functions to them (function assignment). Lexical selection can be likened to locating an entry with the right meaning in the mental reverse dictionary, prior to finding a pronunciation for it (unlike a real dictionary entry). Function assignment is deciding which message element is going to be the grammatical subject, which the direct object, and so on.
### Lexical Processes

#### MESSAGE
- **Lexical selection:**
  - NOUN, mass

#### GRAMMATICAL ENCODING
- **Lexical selection:**
  - colour of the night sky

- **Function assignment:**
  - SUBJECT

- **Role of selected element in message:**
  - TOPIC

#### PHONOLOGICAL ENCODING
- **Sounds:**
  - [b][l][æ][k]

### Structural Processes

#### Role of selected element in message:
- **Message:**
  - Black is my favourite colour.

#### Constituent assembly:
- **Utterance:**
  - Noun Phrase
    - Noun
      - Black

#### Syllable structure:
- **Black**
  - CVC
    - CV
      - b
      - l
    - C
      - æ
      - k

---

**FIG. 12.3** Retrieving a word (black) for production in the utterance Black is my favourite colour.
The operation of lexical selection is discernible in the tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) state. This is the annoying condition that William James described, in which one is quite sure of knowing a word to express a particular meaning, while being unable to retrieve the word's sounds. Some evidence that speakers in this state have in fact selected a particular word, rather than just a concept, comes from a speaker of Italian who suffered brain damage, making it very difficult for him to name pictures of everyday objects. Even when he could only guess at what the first or last sound of the name was, he was almost perfect at choosing the appropriate masculine or feminine article (Badecker, Miozzo, & Zanuttini, 1995). The concepts expressed by these words were not inherently male or female: For example, the Italian word for dessert, dolce, is masculine, and the word for hand, mano, is feminine. The concept alone is not enough to determine the gender of the word. Therefore, the speaker must have been using information about the word itself to make his judgement, showing that he had indeed selected a particular word, even though he was not able to retrieve the sounds of that word.

Lexical selection can go astray in a different way, as in the error “I like berries with my fruit” (produced instead of “I like berries with my cereal”, see in Table 12.1). In such semantic substitutions, an incorrect but related word is selected to express a concept. The problem is analogous to mistakenly picking an entry next to the intended word in the reverse dictionary. The result is a substitution that is similar in meaning to the intended word but not usually similar in sound.

The other component of functional processing is function assignment. Function assignment determines the syntactic role that message elements will play in an utterance. Errors involving the exchange of pronouns are particularly informative about the process. This is because pronouns in English overtly mark syntactic functions like subject (nominative case), object (objective case), possessive (genitive case), and so on, as seen in the respective forms of the masculine singular pronoun in “He liked him and his family”. An illustrative mistake was reported by Garrett (1980b). A speaker intended to say “She offends his sense of how the world should be”, but what came out was “He offends her sense of how the world should be”. This is an exchange of pronouns, but the thing to notice is that it is not a simple exchange of the pronoun forms: The error is not “His offends she sense of how the world should be”. What happened? Apparently, the syntactic function of subject was erroneously assigned to the masculine player in the event, while the possessive function was assigned to the feminine player. In other words, something went wrong during function assignment, causing the message elements to be mapped to the wrong syntactic roles.
The product of functional processing is a representation that indicates for each message element its syntactic role and the words to be used for expressing it. Two important properties of utterances are yet to emerge: The actual order of the phrases and specifications for the sounds of words. These are part of positional processing.

Positional processing

Like functional processing, positional processing involves both a syntactic and a lexical sub-component. The syntactic sub-component is called constituent assembly. It puts phrases, words, and grammatical inflections in order, arranging them in accordance with the grammatical patterns of the language. One error feature that is associated with constituent assembly is termed stranding (see Table 12.1), which reliably accompanies any exchange of inflected words. The occurrence of stranding implies that the stems and affixes of words are positioned separately during processing, even though they eventually surface together in speech. This is illustrated in the utterance of a speaker who intended to say “The dome doesn’t have any windows” and instead said “The window doesn’t have any domes”. Despite the exchange of the word stems dome and window, the plural -s suffix stayed put: It was stranded in the direct object position and affixed itself to dome. The error suggests that function assignment was correctly carried out: The intended subject was singular and the subject remains singular in the error, though the subject noun is the wrong one. Similarly, the intended direct object was plural and the direct object remains plural in the error, though the noun is wrong. Evidently, the problem arose when the processes of constituent assembly positioned the retrieved word forms, putting them into phrase slots like the one shown on the right in Fig. 12.3.

The lexical sub-component of positional processing, lexical retrieval, is concerned with retrieving abstract word forms, like the one shown on the left in Fig. 12.3. More precisely, the outcome of lexical retrieval is a description of a word’s morphology to be filled out in more detail during phonological encoding. Continuing the analogy to the reverse-dictionary entry, lexical retrieval involves finding the part of the entry that indicates the word’s structure and alphabetic spelling (which is likewise a description of a word’s sounds, albeit a different sort of description than one envisions for the mental lexicon). One type of error that may be attributable to disruptions in lexical retrieval is the phonological word-substitution, sometimes termed a malapropism. The substituted word sounds similar to the intended word (e.g. “committee” instead of “community”; see Table 12.1) but need not be related to it in meaning. This indicates that similar-sounding word forms can interfere with one another during
Phonological Encoding

Whereas grammatical encoding manipulates words or morphemes as wholes, phonological encoding manipulates the components of words, the speech sounds. It is responsible for putting phonemes and syllables in order, within representations that carry the rhythmic and intonational qualities of the language. It determines how the individual sounds of a word are pronounced, how they should be ordered, where syllable boundaries are, and so on. At the bottom of Fig. 12.3, the sounds of the word black are spelled out in preparation for assignment to slots in a syllabic frame that helps to control the articulation of speech.

Failures of phonological encoding are revealed in such errors as sound exchanges, perseverations, and anticipations (see Table 12.1). These errors show that phonological encoding is, like grammatical encoding, tightly constrained. Phoneme exchanges almost always involve sounds from the same class (consonant or vowel; MacKay, 1970). Elements are more likely to exchange when the sounds that precede or follow them are phonetically similar (Garrett, 1975). There is a positional constraint, as well, such that errors tend to implicate the same parts of different syllables. For example, in the error “lust list” (in Table 12.1), the cluster of syllable-final consonants (or coda) in the intended word “lush” was replaced by the coda of the following word, “list.” Errors in which different parts of successive syllables interact (e.g. “stush list”) are rare.

The product of phonological encoding serves as input to the articulatory processes that actually give voice to the utterance. Although not the focus of this chapter, articulation is itself a complex skill: Producing the roughly 15 sounds per second that make up fluent speech requires the rapid co-ordination of more groups of muscles than are involved in any other mechanical performance of the human body (Fink, 1986).

An Alternative Perspective on Speech Errors?

The information-processing approach exemplified by the model in Fig. 12.1 stands in stark contrast to a more famous theory of the origin of speech errors, that of Sigmund Freud. Freud formulated his views in reaction to the work of an Austrian linguist of the late 1800s named Rudolf Meringer (Meringer & Mayer, 1895/1978). Meringer recorded the speech errors he heard, and noticed that errors often involved linguistic
elements that are similar to one another. He suggested that errors might come about because of transient changes in the memory strength of words or sounds that cause them to appear in places where they do not belong. This is reminiscent of claims in some contemporary production theories (e.g. Dell, 1986), close relatives of the model we have sketched in this chapter.

Freud, in contrast, speculated that the true sources of errors lie beyond the mundane linguistic similarities that Meringer emphasised. As almost everyone knows, Freud proposed that errors were the result of unconscious intentions that coloured or played havoc with the consciously intended message. He offered the instance of a professor who said “In the case of the female genital, in spite of the tempting ... I mean, the attempted...” (Freud, 1924/1935, p. 38). Another of Freud’s examples was analysed as originating in the underlying ill-feeling of a worker toward his boss. The worker called on his colleagues before a meal to “burp [aufzustossen] to the health of our chief” instead of “drink a toast [anzustossen] to the health of our chief” (Freud, 1924/1935, p. 38).

Freud’s idea that speech errors reveal unconscious motives was clearly more provocative than Meringer’s. It was so provocative, in fact, that there was very little work on speech errors from a cognitive or linguistic perspective for many years after Freud produced his psychodynamic analysis.

Yet there are fundamental weaknesses in the Freudian account. One is that hardly any speech errors have a clear Freudian interpretation. Most errors are at best innocuous and at worst downright boring, as the examples in Table 12.1 testify. Freud may have been misled by the properties of the sample of speech errors he observed or, more likely, he over-emphasised the most interesting of the mistakes that he encountered. Ellis (1980) showed that Freud’s collection of errors is indeed unrepresentative of the distribution that arises in everyday speaking.

A second problem with the Freudian account is also apparent in Table 12.1. Almost all speech errors show a strong influence of purely linguistic factors. Consider the “toasting/burping” example again, in the original German form: “Ich födere sie auf, auf das wohl unseres chefs aufzustossen.” The substituted word aufzustossen is very similar to the intended word anzustossen, and the word auf appeared twice prior to its erroneous appearance, suggesting that it was very strongly primed. Freud considered this and dismissed it out of hand (Freud, 1924/1935, pp. 53–54), embracing as the only possibility that the production of a word or phrase entails the representation of a relevant meaning within what we have termed the speaker’s message. The linguistic constraints on errors, their most prominent characteristics, have no satisfactory explanation in this framework.
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None of this means that Freud was demonstrably wrong in his hypo-
theses about the causes of errors. None the less, his hypotheses explain very
little about most mistakes in speech, overlooking or omitting most of the
data. The study of speech errors therefore returned to Meringer’s original
interest in what errors can tell us about how people talk, instead of what
they might reveal about the darker recesses of people’s thought. Building
from this work on errors, experimental research has begun to uncover a
variety of facts about the kinds of processes that are involved in speaking.

EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH ON LANGUAGE
PRODUCTION

Although analyses of errors in spontaneous speech served as the starting
point for the contemporary study of language production, there is much
more for a theory to explain. Errors are rare events, particularly when we
consider them in light of ordinary speech achievements. Measurements of
normal speech rates give average values of about 150 words per minute
(Maclay & Osgood, 1959) or 5.65 syllables per second (Deese, 1984).
Although this speech is liberally sprinkled with pauses and false starts,
outright error is very uncommon. For example, in a tape-recorded corpus
of nearly 15,000 utterances, Deese (1984) counted only 77 syntactic
anomalies—roughly one in every 195 utterances. Heeschen (1993)
reported a similarly low incidence of syntactic errors in spoken German.
Errors of lexical selection and retrieval (such as semantic and phonologi-
word-substitutions) are even less common, with attested rates aver-
ing under one per 1000 words (Bock & Levelt, 1994). Sound errors are
rarest of all, occurring less than once in every 2000 words. The implica-
tion is that the most challenging facts about speaking stem from its
general accuracy and fluency.

These normal levels of speech performance reflect the workings of an
information-handling system of great complexity and considerable effi-
ciency. To discover the system’s properties, we must rely on subtle but
powerful experimental techniques that can reliably detect the fleeting
cognitive operations that give rise to speech. These techniques make it
possible to examine the details of production processes in rigorous and
systematic ways. To illustrate the experimental study of language produc-
tion, we will present experiments designed to illuminate the workings of
the components of the model in Fig. 12.1.

Message creation

Processing in the message component is responsible for determining the
communicative content of the intended utterance. One thing a message
should do, if it is to succeed in communication, is ensure that the expressions that are used to refer to things will be understandable to the listener. For instance, if one wants a listener to pick out a particular photograph from among a set of photographs of buildings in New York City, one must choose a referring expression that makes contact with what the listener knows. A particular building could be referred to in any of several ways, such as “the Citicorp building” or “the building with the slanty roof”. The first expression will work well if the person one is talking to is familiar with the names of buildings in New York City; otherwise, the second expression will work better. The decision about which expression to use is a decision about what to put in one’s message.

Isaacs and Clark (1987) studied exactly this situation. In their experiment, one person (the director) viewed a display of postcards depicting landmarks in New York City. The second person in the experiment (the matcher) viewed a display that had the same postcards in a different order. Neither participant could see the other’s display. The only task was to get the matcher’s postcards into the same order as the director’s. However, none of the pictures were visibly labelled, so the partners had to come up with their own expressions to refer to them. So the director could say something along the lines of “The first picture is the Citicorp Building” or “The first picture is a building with a slanty roof”.

The twist in the experiment was that some of the directors and matchers were knowledgeable about New York City, and some were not. Isaacs and Clark found that the participants quickly determined whether their partners could successfully identify pictures based on proper names (Citicorp Building) or needed more descriptive expressions (building with a slanty roof). The directors adapted their subsequent utterances appropriately, using more descriptive expressions when their listeners were unfamiliar with New York City landmarks and more proper names when directors and matchers both were knowledgeable.

This is an example of just one factor that enters into determining the substance of an utterance. It may seem obvious, but its implications are far-ranging. The content of a message typically includes more than “just the facts” that the speaker intends to convey, going beyond them to incorporate information specifically tailored to the communicative context (Clark & Bly, 1995). Message formulation can demand a great deal of problem solving, much more so than the rather mechanical operations of the encoding processes. One upshot is that speakers frequently fail to plan their messages adequately, and communication may suffer as a result (Horton & Keysar, 1996).

In addition to specifying the content of an utterance, a message must also signal the relative prominence of its components. Most important, it must indicate which element is the topic of the utterance, what the
utterance is about. Things can become topics by attracting attention, a process illustrated in a study by Forrest (1993). In Forrest’s experiments, speakers watching a computer screen had to describe the physical relation between two pictured objects like those shown in Fig. 12.4.

Immediately before the pair of objects was displayed, a cue was presented at the screen location where one of the objects would appear, drawing the speaker’s attention to that location. Forrest found that this attentional manipulation strongly influenced how speakers described the scenes. Speakers were more likely to say “The heart is above the star” when their attention was directed to the heart than when it was directed to the star, and more likely to say “The star is below the heart” when their attention was directed to the star than when it was directed to the heart. Thus, it appears that an element that a speaker is attending to, an element that constitutes the intended topic, is likely to be given a prominent position in the utterance.

Grammatical encoding: Structural processes

Grammatical encoding is responsible for translating the message into a series of words, and comprises assigning syntactic functions (like subject) and arraying words in a grammatical order. Consider how one might describe the event pictured in Fig. 12.5. One could say, “The boy is being awakened by the alarm clock”—a passive sentence with “the boy” as subject—but one could also say, “The alarm clock is awakening the boy”—an active sentence with “the alarm clock” as subject. The idea is virtually the same in either case. What determines which noun is assigned the syntactic function of subject? Forrest’s (1993) results suggest that function assignment takes the most prominent message element, the topic, and
assigns it the role of subject. Since animate objects (humans and animals especially) tend to attract attention in events, a likely subject is the boy.

Bock, Loebell, and Morey (1992) relied on this tendency to examine the relationship between function assignment and constituent assembly. In their experiment, subjects were presented with a series of spoken sentences and pictures, one by one. The subjects repeated each sentence and described each picture. The critical manipulation in the experiment lay in the properties of the sentences that preceded the target pictures (the "prime" sentences). The sentences varied on two dimensions, as illustrated in Table 12.2. One dimension was the animacy of the subject and object noun phrases: The subject of the prime sentence was either an animate noun phrase ("five people") or an inanimate noun phrase ("the boat"). The goal of the animacy variation was to prime the function assignment process: The type of assignment pattern used in one sentence (that is, in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priming Condition</th>
<th>Example Sentence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active, animate subject</td>
<td>Five people carried the boat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active, inanimate subject</td>
<td>The boat carried five people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive, animate subject</td>
<td>Five people were carried by the boat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive, inanimate subject</td>
<td>The boat was carried by five people.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
jects (humans and animals likely subject is the boy. Its tendency to examine the constituent assembly. In a series of spoken sentences repeated each sentence and on in the experiment lay in the target pictures (the dimensions, as illustrated y of the subject and object nce was either an animate noun phrase ("the boat"). the function assignment in one sentence (that is, in the priming sentence) should tend to be repeated in a subsequent sentence (the sentence used to describe the target picture). For example, if the subject of a prime sentence was inanimate (either "The boat carried five people" or "The boat was carried by five people"), there may be a tendency to try to assign the inanimate entity in the target picture to the subject function (saying "The alarm clock wakened the boy"). The events depicted in the target pictures always included one animate and one inanimate entity, either of which could serve as the sentence subject (as in "The alarm clock wakened the boy" or "The boy was wakened by the alarm clock"). However, with function priming, there should be more sentences with inanimate subjects after primes with inanimate subjects than after primes with animate subjects.

The second variation in the priming sentences was in their syntactic form: They could be in the active voice ("Five people carried the boat"); "The boat carried five people") or in the passive ("Five people were carried by the boat"); "The boat was carried by five people"). The goal of this manipulation was to prime the constituent assembly process. Having used a particular syntactic structure for the prime sentence, the constituent assembly process may tend to repeat that structure in describing the target picture. So, active descriptions of the target picture should be more likely following active prime sentences than following passive prime sentences.

Both of these manipulations affected speakers' descriptions: First, inanimate subjects were more likely following primes with inanimate subjects, showing that function assignment tends to repeat the previous mapping of animacy to syntactic function. Second, active sentences were more likely following active primes than following passive primes, showing a tendency for constituent assembly to encode a recently produced structure. This argues that function assignment and constituent assembly are separable processes.

Grammatical encoding: Lexical processes

Recall that lexical selection is the process of identifying an entry from the mental lexicon for conveying the intended meaning. Earlier, we described the case of a brain-damaged speaker, which showed that a word can be selected and its grammatical properties accessed without its sounds becoming available. Is this true for normal speakers? This seems to be what happens when one is in a tip-of-the-tongue state: One has a word in mind but the sounds of the word are inaccessible. To find out whether speakers in a TOT state have in fact selected a particular word (rather than a concept), Vigliocco, Garrett, and Antonini (1997) asked speakers of Italian who were having a TOT experience to identify the gender of the word that they were unable to retrieve. Even when they knew nothing
about how the word sounded, the speakers were able to identify the gender over 80% of the time. Because the concepts expressed by these nouns were neither masculine nor feminine, the ability of the Italian speakers to identify the gender of a wayward noun must be due to their having selected a particular word. This argues that word meanings and word forms are separately represented, and that lexical retrieval is a necessary component of the production process.

Phonological encoding

When the form of a word is retrieved, its sounds must be individually encoded in preparation for ordered production. We pointed out earlier that sound exchanges seem to involve phonemes of the same phonological category (consonant or vowel), in similar phonetic environments, and in similar syllable position. For example, in the vowel exchange “accipital activity” (see Table 12.1), the exchanging vowels were both followed by the consonant /k/ and occurred in the same syllable position.

Dell (1984) tested this observation experimentally, using a procedure developed by Baars, Motley, and MacKay (1975). In this procedure, the speaker is presented visually with pairs of words, like the following:

- bid meek
- bud meek
- big men
- mad back

After certain pairs, the speaker is cued to say the words out loud. Sometimes speakers make errors when saying the words, and these are recorded. In order to increase the likelihood of an error, the target trials are preceded by several trials that are designed to bias the subject to make a slip. For example, if the target trial is the pair mad back, the three preceding trials would all have pairs in which the first word started with a /b/ sound and the second with an /m/ sound, biasing the subject to slip on the target pair and mistakenly say bad mack. Dell compared the likelihood of a slip occurring for pairs like mad back, in which both words have the same vowel, and pairs like mad bake, in which the words have different vowels. He found that exchanges of word-initial phonemes (bad mack or bad make) were more likely when the words contained the same vowel, confirming the pattern hinted at in naturalistic errors.

An important aspect of phonological encoding is placing sounds in syllable frames, as illustrated at the bottom of Fig. 12.3. This helps to ensure the correct ordering of phonemes, because syllable frames specify the order of consonants and vowels within the syllable. Syllables with
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The experimental approach to the study of language production has largely confirmed the picture developed through analysis of spontaneous speech errors, but there are a number of advantages of experimental methods over purely observational investigations. First, experiments avoid some of the biases inherent in the collecting of errors. Some speech errors are simply more noticeable or more easily remembered than others. Experiments can investigate the full range of errors and so give a more accurate picture of production failures. Just as important, experiments extend the investigation of language production to include aspects of normal error-free production that cannot be investigated adequately through naturalistic observation. For instance, because speakers often talk about animate entities (such as other people), in naturally occurring speech the subjects of sentences are often animate. It is only through experimental manipulation that this normal correlation of animacy and subjecthood can be teased apart in order to investigate (for example) the
process of function assignment. Experimental approaches to the study of language production therefore promise to shed new light on the workings of the language production system, going well beyond the understanding provided by the analysis of speech errors.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE STRUCTURE

We have already alluded to one of the most striking facts about language production, but it deserves explicit mention. At every level of processing, there are powerful structural constraints that govern the arrangements of elements. In speech errors, this shows up as restrictions on the elements that interact with one another. When words interact with one another, they come from the same grammatical class. When sounds interact with one another, they come from the same phonological (vowel or consonant) class. The consequence is that the basic structural patterns of the utterances are preserved even in errors.

This principle is vividly clear in stranding errors. In “you ordered up ending some fish dish” (said instead of “you ended up ordering some fish dish”; Garrett, 1993), the past tense and progressive affixes (-ed and -ing) occurred in the correct locations. Had they moved along with the word stems, the sentence would have become ungrammatical: “You ordering up ended some fish dish.” But the inflections generally do not move, and the syntactic structure remains intact.

Notice that the structure is stable in the face of radical distortions of the speaker’s intended meaning. Errors such as “dinner will be served at wine” (Fromkin, 1973) and “a room in your phone” are abysmal failures as vehicles for the speaker’s communicative intention. (Take a moment to work out what the speakers of these errors actually intended. Both errors involve word exchanges.) Yet the utterances observe normal grammatical constraints. The rarity with which errors make sense, hidden or otherwise, is a challenge not only to claims like Freud’s but also to any theory that overlooks the complex information processing system that mediates the translation of thoughts into language.

Considerations such as these have led contemporary theories of language production to emphasise the structural and information-processing constraints on speech, rather than the processes determining what the speaker means to convey. As one of the contemporary pioneers of language production research pointed out (Garrett, 1980a, p. 216), “The production system must get the details of form ‘right’ in every instance, whether those details are germane to sentence meaning or not”. For example, verbs in English agree in number with their subjects (“She sneezes” vs. “They sneeze”), and this agreement operates in virtually every utterance that a speaker produces. Yet number agreement affects meaning...
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hardly at all. If number inflection is omitted by mistake, the sentence is still understandable. In the past tense, number is completely unmarked on most verbs ("She sneezed" and "They sneezed"). Even so, when number marking is required, speakers almost always get it right. Thus, the creation of linguistic structure is central to any account of what people do when they talk.

LANGUAGE PRODUCTION IN PSYCHOLINGUISTICS

Speaking is only one part of what we do with language, because speakers are also listeners. Neither speaking nor listening can be fully explained without the other, so the relationship between language production and language comprehension is a natural target of curiosity. Both put our knowledge of language to work. But they put it to work in different ways, inasmuch as they differ in their goals. Production starts from a meaning to be conveyed and then works to convert that message ultimately into a series of speech sounds. Comprehension, by contrast, starts with speech sounds (or written letters) and works toward determining the meaning conveyed by those sounds.

As a consequence of this fundamental difference in the problems that the two systems must solve, we might expect them to differ considerably in their operation. For instance, the comprehension system must have ways to deal with ambiguous input, because natural language is rife with ambiguities. When one hears a sentence such as The spy observed the man with binoculars, one must decide whether the spy is using the binoculars to observe the man, or whether the spy is observing a man who is carrying binoculars. There is presumably no ambiguity in the mind of the speaker of the sentence, though, about which message is intended. Conversely, it is possible that comprehension of some sentences does not require a complete syntactic analysis of the sentence; the meanings of the words might be enough to give the listener a good idea of the meaning of the sentence as a whole. If one hears a sentence containing "villagers," "soldiers", and "massacred", one can understand that the soldiers massacred the villagers without having to decide which noun was the subject of the sentence and which the direct or indirect object. Of course, one might be wrong—the villagers may actually have massacred the soldiers—but there may be times when just knowing the words in their context is enough to understand the speaker, without a complete syntactic analysis of the utterance. But in producing a sentence, a speaker necessarily assigns syntactic functions to every element of the sentence; it is only by deciding which phrase will be the subject, which the direct object, and so on that a grammatical utterance can be formed—there is no way around syntactic processing for the speaker.
Although there is reason, then, to believe that production and comprehension may operate in different ways, there is also reason to believe that at some level they draw on the same linguistic knowledge. After all, every one of us both speaks and understands our native language. Communication occurs because speakers and listeners know the same code, a code that governs how arrangements of sounds and words convey meaning, allowing us (Pinker, 1994, p. 15):

to shape events in each other's brains with exquisite precision. I am not referring to telepathy or mind control or the other obsessions of fringe science; even in the depictions of believers these are blunt instruments compared to an ability that is uncontroversially present in every one of us. That ability is language. Simply by making noises with our mouths, we can reliably cause precise new combinations of ideas to arise in each other's minds.

CONCLUSION

Titchener's (1909) introspection failed him when he claimed that talking is as easy as reading from a memory manuscript. The errors that people make reveal that speech is the product of a complex information-processing system that must piece together words and sounds to convey messages. We have sketched an outline of that system and showed how the workings of its components are being explored through experimental research. As this research proceeds, our sketch will come closer to a blueprint of how normal speakers draw on their linguistic knowledge to formulate utterances. The confluence of this explanation with models of normal comprehension, with accounts of the development of fluent speaking ability in children, and with descriptions of the disintegration of speech due to brain injury and the diseases of ageing, should offer a better understanding of the cognitive architecture of human language and its contribution to human communication.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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